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Abstract. Since the 1980s, the Indonesian government has been highly promoting individual land certification (ILC) program
as a national strategy to facilitate development. National programs like Proyek Operasi National Agraria (PRONA) and Layanan
Rakyat Untuk Sertifikasi Tanah (LARASITA) are launched by the Indonesian National Land Agency (NLA) to facilitate ILC
programs in rural areas. The programs have reached many rural areas in eastern Indonesia. Utilizing the combination of qualitative
and quantitative research methodology by way of 30 in-depth interviews and 320 questionnaire, this research aims to evaluate
the government programs on ILC in rural Flores, Indonesia. The research finds that ILC programs may have led to the increased
poverty, land transactions and land speculations that boost land tenure conflicts which hinder the development in rural Flores. This
research proposes colective land certification (CLC) program as an alternative for rural development.
Keywords: individual land certifications, colective land certifications, land tenure conflicts, rural development, and rural
Flores
Abstrak. Sejak tahun 1980, pemerintah Indonesia sudah gencar mempromosikan program sertifikasi tanah individual sebagai
bagian dari agenda neoliberal dalam strategi pembangunan nasional. Beberapa program nasional seperti Proyek Operasi Nasional
Agraria (PRONA) dan Layanan Rakyat Untuk Sertifikasi Tanah diterbitkan (LARASITA) oleh Badan Pertanahan Nasional untuk
mempercepat proses sertifikasi tanah individual di daerah pendesaan dan daerah terpencil. Program-program ini dewasa ini sudah
beroperasi di level pedesaan di Indonesia Timur. Menggunakan pendekatan kombinasi antara kualitatif dan kuantitatif dengan
melakukan 30 wawancara mendalam dan 320 pengisian kuesioner, penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengevaluasi program-program
pemerintah pemberian sertifikat tanah individual di Flores. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa program-program pemberian
sertifikat tanah individual telah meningkatkan transaksi penjualan dan spekulasi tanah, yang melahirkan konflik agraria horisontal
yang menghalang pembangunan di Flores. Penelitian ini merekomendasikan pemberian sertifikat tanah kolektif sebagai solusi
alternatifnya.
Kata kunci: sertifikasi tanah individual, sertifikasi tanah kolektif, konflik agraria horisontal dan pembangunan, dan flores

INTRODUCTION
After the government of Indonesia implemented
decentralization in 2001, land tenure conflicts had
occurred in many regions in Indonesia (Barron &
Kaiser 2009, Adam 2010). In 2011, for instance, land
tenure conflicts broke in Mesuji, Bima, Pulau Padang,
and Jambi (Tolo 2012a). Further, between 2004-2012,
there were 618 land tenure conflicts across Indonesia
which covered 2,399,314.48 hectares land and involved
731,342 households. According to the 2012 data, 40% of
land tenure conflicts in Indonesia occurred in plantation
sector, 30% in infrastructure development sector, 11%
in mining sector, 4% in forestry sector, 4 % in coastal
economic development sector. These conflicts broke
in 29 provinces with provinces of East Java and North
Sumatra ranked as the most conflictions agrarian in
Indonesia (Arsyad 2012a). The conflicts related to land
disputes in Indonesia seem to escalate annually as, in
2013, it reached 4,000 cases (BPN 2013). In general,
most of these land tenure conflicts have been inclined to

lead to human rights violations (Wiradi 2005).
Land tenure conflicts in Indonesia are generally
vertical in nature such as conflicts between (1) the state
and society, (2) developers and (local) communities, and
(3) developers and the state vis a vis (local) communities
(Lucas 1997). These vertical conflicts are caused mainly
by two factors, namely: (1) land right uncertainty (Prior
2013) and (2) privatization for capital accumulation
done both by the state and investors (developers) (Lucas
1997). Conflicts on land rights uncertainty usually
occur between the government and indigenous peoples
in relation to forest boundaries. While privatization
for capital accumulation has induced the developers
to align themselves with the government –in some
cases the alliance involves some of the rural elites of
indigenous peoples (Regus 2011)– to exploit the land
for the benefits of the state and developers, especially in
new autonomous regions in Indonesia (Tolo 2012b, Tolo
2013a). Many resource-rich autonomous regions have
involved in the privatization of (customary) land and
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other natural resources for the sake capital accumulation
in general and district income generation in particular
(Dwiyanto 2003, Antlov 2003, Lucas 1997, Regus 2011,
Borras et.al 2012, Prasojo & Holidin 2012).
In contrast, this article aims to explain the horizontal
land tenure conflicts between individuals within
societies, caused by the development strategy of
capitalism in agrarian sector. The strategy that will be
evaluated throughout this article is related to individual
land certification (ILC) programs in Eastern Indonesia as
the poorest region in Indonesia in which approximately
70% of villages (32,000 villages) are categorized as lessdeveloped villages (desa tertinggal). On the one hand,
the nature of horizontal land tenure conflicts is similar
to vertical land tenure conflicts. The similarity lies in
the motive of capital expansions as the source of land
tenure conflicts as both types of conflicts are triggered
by the efforts of individuals and corporations to expand
their capital. The difference is that vertical land tenure
conflicts are generally induced by land right uncertainty,
whilst horizontal land tenure conflicts are mainly driven
by the clarity of land property rights. To understand this
problem, this article analyses the implementation of ILC
programs in rural Flores, Indonesia.
The ideology of capitalism in agrarian systems has
long been rooted in the Indonesian society since the
colonial era (Soemardjan 1962, Tondronegoro & Wiradi
2008, Mulyanto 2011). During the New Order era, land
privatization intensified dramatically as the Law 5/1960
on Basic Agrarian Law (BAL), which aims to carry out
land reforms in Indonesia, was only granted authority
to manage 30% of the total land in Indonesia. The
Forestry Law 1967 allocated 70% of Indonesian land
to be managed by National Forestry Department (Gold
& Zuckerman 2015, Kristiansen & Sulistiawati 2016).
This means that the BAL 1960 only has the authority
to regulate non-forest land in Indonesia (Tolo 2013b).
Furthermore, Indonesian land tenure system is very
much in favour of domestic and foreign investments,
especially after the enactment of the Law 1/1967 on
Foreign Investment and the Law 11/1968 on Domestic
Investment (Siahaan 2007). These two laws have led
to the exploitation of domestic resources such as land,
forests, and seas for the need of capital accumulation
(Tolo 2014a, Tolo 2014c). In addition, the BAL 1960
which was initially handled by the Ministry of Agrarian
Affairs (Depertemen Agraria) was submitted to the
National Land Agency (LNA) which deals more with
administrative works (Setiawan 2008). In 1971, the
New Order government ceased the fund for land reform
programs as they were no longer a government priority
(Lucas 1992). In the 1980s, the ideology of neoliberalism
in the agrarian sector became the primary choice of the
New Order, even up to date, following the instruction of
the IFM and the World Bank proposals (Awang 2005).
As a consequence, land privatization in Indonesia
becomes the main agenda of the state, which in turn
has led to land grabbing in many parts of Indonesia
(Lucas 1992, Lucas 1997, Obidzinki et.al 2013, Tolo
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2014b). With the promulgation of the laws on foreign
and domestic investments during the New Order period,
land privatization may has resulted in the loss of 143
million hectares of the Indonesian forest (Siahaan
2007: 18). After the collapse of the New Order regime,
land grabbing still becomes serious conundrums in
Indonesia. For example, in the last decade, in North
Sulawesi, 450 hectares of agricultural land were seized
from the indigenous farmers. In Papua, nearly 5 million
hectares of customary land were grabbed for the sake
of the international carbon trades. Meanwhile, in Jambi,
101,000 hectares of customary land had been claimed
by the government as conservation areas. In Ulu Masen,
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD), more lese 750,000
hectares of customary land had been prevented by the
government to be cultivated by local farmers (Tolo
2012a). Arsyad (2012b) shows the current data reveals
that 11.5 million hectares of forest areas in Indonesia
have been converted into oil palm plantations, which
could affect negatively to rural economies. According
to Borras and Franco (2011: 29), in Indonesia, oil palm
expansions will be reaching 20 million hectares by
2020 and 30 million hectares by 2025. This expansion
of oil palm plantation may have caused the destruction
of cultural and socioeconomic wealth of Indonesian
indigenous people (Obidzinki et al. 2013, Magdoff
2013).
As national development has been based on the
neoliberal ideology since the 1980s (Robison 1986),
the problem of poverty seems difficult to be overcome
despite the fact that Indonesia economies have
experienced annual positive economic growth (Tolo
2014, Hartati 2015). In 2013, there were approximately
68 million poor and near-poor in Indonesia (Saparani
2014), of which about 63% were farmers whose lives
are very much dependent on agricultural land in rural
areas (BPS 2013). In 2016, out of 252 million people,
there were 28.2 million poor people (Zain, 2016). More
surprisingly, if poverty is measured based on human
develop dimensions, which includes “the fulfilment
of basic human needs; access to education, health, or
government services; and the opportunity to participate
in the social, economic, and political sector without
any discrimination,” the Wold Bank Report of Poverty
Reduction in Indonesia predicts that more than half of
Indonesians are considered as poor people (Mulyani
2015: 288). Nevertheless, NLA keeps promoting
neoliberal strategy of ILC programs through the
National Agrarian Operations Project (PRONA) and the
People’s Service for Land Certification (LARASITA)
(in 1981 and 2006 respectively). As a consequence, in
2013, approximately 45 million tracts of the land had
been certified in 430 districts and cities out of a total
of more than 100 million certifications (BPN 2013).
It means that only about 40%-45% of the private land
in Indonesia have been registered. In other words,
it is only 5% of the total land in Indonesia have been
certified (Yusuf 2011, Kristiansen & Sulistiawati 2016).
Due to the fact that the country has just achieved 40%
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of its target in land registration or, according to Gold
& Zuckerman (2015), 45% out of 85 million private
parcels of land, the current government under Joko
Widodo’s administration has committed to issuing 60
million land titles in the next three years until 2021
(Adi 2016, Chin 2016). This commitment seems very
ambitious if compared to previous years’ achievement
of 560,000 to 5,200,000 parcels per year between 20072011 (Gold & Zuckerman 2015: 64).
The privatization of land and ILC programs may
have led to the increase of Gini coefficient of land
ownership in Indonesia as land is mainly concentrated
into hands of the state and several political-economy
elites. In 2013, Indonesian natural resources, including
land, were dominated by 0.01% of large corporations,
which contributed to 41.83% of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) and 82.98% of exports. In contrast, about
98.88% of micro business units were ignored and in
difficulties in finding economic resources (Palupi 2014).
Since the introduction of the PRONA and LARASITA
(Lucas, 1992), the Gini coefficient of land ownership
has continued to increase, standing at 0.5 in 1983 to
0.7 in 2003 (Policy Initiative Review 2011). In 2011,
a farmer in Indonesia only possessed 0.3 hectares of
productive agricultural land on average. This is because,
nationally, only about 0.2% of Indonesia’s population
owns 56% of productive assets, of which 87% are land,
while farmers living in the forest areas are only allowed
to manage 0.25 million hectares of forest. Thus, only
about 0.19% of rural residents have legal access to forest
areas (Kasali 2014; Arsyad 2012b). Furthermore, land
registration may have increased the sale and purchase of
land, which in turn increase the Gini coefficient of land
ownership in Indonesia. For example, in 2011-2013,
there were approximately 2.3 million land transactions
in Indonesia (BPN 2013).
The abovementioned failure of national development
in Indonesia is partly because neoliberal ideology as a
national development strategy, especially in relation to
ILC programs, as Boras (2007) has it, is too “incomecentered and growth-oriented.” The neoliberal ideology
also tends to ignore the democratization of the economy in
societies (Yustika 2012). Warren and Lucas (2013) argue
that, post-Suharto’s authoritarian regime, governments
in Indonesia have introduced land privatization,
including ILC programs, based on de Soto’s seminal
work (2002), which is very much influenced by Western
capitalism. In his book, The Mystery of Capital, de Soto
(2002) claims that developing countries have failed to
make use of capitalism as they are not able to formalize
their property rights, including land rights, to facilitate
market functionalities in a society. According to de
Soto (2000), people in developing countries that hold
vast assets could benefit from capitalism only if they
“unlocking the capital potential assets held informally
by poor people” by instituting a property rights system
and disseminating information on property rights (as
cited in Musembi 1457-1458). However, in the shortterm, privatization based on de Soto’s thesis (2000),
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ILC programs, seems to support the development of
the (rural) communities in Indonesia, but in the long
run it will of course lead to social, cultural, political
and economic catastrophes. Moreover, the ideology of
neoliberalism in land privatization tends to treat land
as commodities (Akram-Lodhi 2013). Challenging de
Soto’s thesis (2001), through her fieldwork in Surakarta,
Indonesia, Mulyani (2015: 297) “suggest[s] that
legalizing land rights as proposed by de Soto (2001) does
not necessarily provide security of land ownership” as
land can be easily sold band bought between the willing
sellers and buyers. This commodification of land may
have caused land inequality, which needs to be solved
through agrarian reform policies based on a political
economy perspective.
Studies in political economy aim to “understand the
relationship between economic growth and poverty [...]
by seeing the ways more powerful classes accumulate by
appropriating surplus from less powerful” (Corta, 2010:
18). Bernstein (2010: 22-23) offers four key questions
to evaluate the relationship between economic growth
and poverty as follows: “(1) who owns what?; 2) who
does what?; (3) who gets what?; and (4) what do they do
with it?” These four questions can be used to understand
the problem of political economy in every society “at
different historical moments” (Berstein 2010: 24). By
answering these four questions, we can understand the
position of the peasants in agrarian sectors as we look
at the dynamics of social relations through in which
the poor are exploited and oppressed by the rich. In the
agrarian sectors, such unequal relations have encouraged
people to fight for agrarian reforms as has been done by
Gracchi brothers during the Roman Empire (Barlowe
1953).
An agrarian reform is commonly defined as “a
rearrangement or restructuring of the ownership, control
and use of agrarian resources, especially land, as the basis
for national industrialization, for the benefits of peasants,
agricultural labourers, and poor people.” (Setiawan
2008: 414). In addition to supporting industrialization,
the objective of agrarian reform is to reduce agrarian
inequality, which in turn may prevent the exploitation
of landless and land hungry people by the wealthy in
societies. Historically, the first great agrarian reform
took place in France as a result of the French revolution,
which in turn influenced the widespread emancipation
of peasants in Western Europe and Eastern Europe to
carry out agrarian reform (Morrisson & Snyder 2000).
Since then, many peasant uprisings occurred in 1848
in Eastern Europe, in Russia in 1861 and 1905-1906
(Barlowe 1953). After the second world war, a wave of
agrarian reforms took place in several countries such as
Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Egypt and India (Tolo 2013b).
In Indonesia, right after its independence, the
founding fathers and mothers had thought of agrarian
sector as the basis for developing the country (Luthfi
et al. 2011). For example, Hatta (1943) gave inputs
to the Panitia Adat Istiadat dan Tata Usaha Lama to
consider Indonesia as an ‘agrarian country’. Land as the
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main means of production must be regulated fairly for
the prosperity of all Indonesian people. In the 1960s,
Sukarno often asserted that “land reform is an absolute
part of our revolution” and “a revolution without land
reform is like building a building without a strong
foundation.” For Hatta and Sukarno, land reform was a
necessary condition for the Indonesians to fight for their
sovereignty (Setiawan 2010).
In 1945, as an experiment, agrarian reform was
conducted by the Minister of Home Affairs, in a village
in Banyumas, Central Java (Soemardjan 1962). Three
years later, the government issued the Law 13/1948
which was later replaced by the Law 5/1950 (Rachman
2012, Luthfi et al. 2011). Under this law, peasants were
entitled to land which was previously controlled by the
Dutch companies. In 1940, the Dutch companies (40
Dutch sugar companies) owned 42,544 hectares land
in Yogyakarta and Surakarta (Soemardjan 1962). On
September 24 1960, President Sukarno passed a Law
5/1960 on Basic Agrarian Law (BAL), which aimed to
implement land reform (Luthfi et al. 2011). Government
Regulation 224/1961 was issued to become a basis for
land distribution under the land reform agenda (Rachman
2012). However, after the fall of Sukarno in 1966, the
issue of land reform also disappeared from the national
politic agenda. When Suharto took the power, agrarian
reform policy experienced total stagnation (Luthfi et al.
2011). In 1971, the government ceased funds to finance
the land reform programs. This was a signal that “...
agrarian reform was no longer a government priority”
(Lucas 1992: 83).
After the collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian regime,
the post-Suharto governments keep promising to
implement land reform in Indonesia. However, not only
do the governments have not fulfilled their promised,
but also have offered land titling programs as the
substitution for land reform programs (Mulyani 2015),
which in turn may increase severe land inequality in the
future as warned by Mulyani (2015). Looking at the
political will of the post-Suharto governments, working
class people in Indonesia should propose land reform by
leverage (Powelson & Stock 198, Wiradi 2000). In this
land reform, people, especially working class (farmers),
do not wait on governments’ initiatives known as land
reform by clemency (Wiradi 2000), rather they should
get organized and put more endeavours to fight for
land reforms, utilising the existing freedom after the
collapse of the Suharto’s authoritarian regime. It should
be mindful that, after implementing agrarian reform by
leverage, there should be avoided uncertainty of land
ownership rights so that every individual may cultivate
his or her land productively based on BAL 1960.
However, the uncertainty of land ownership is
a common in many developing countries and is
considered as a hindrance to progress and development
(Feder & Onchan 1987, Maura 2005, Myers and Hetz
2004). Maura (2005: 197) argues that the uncertainty
of land ownership may have become “obstacle to
economic development and generated multiple negative
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ramifications for poverty and overall human well-being.”
In addition, “[t]he absence of clear property rights is
undermining investment, contributing to corruption,
and undermining economic development” (Myers &
Hetz 2004: i).
Some scholars argue that the clarity of land
ownership is only obtained through privatization by
having individual land certifications (ILCs) (Myers
& Hetz 2004). Feder & Onchan (1987: 311). These
scholars, who conducted research in Thailand, argue
that the legal clarity of ownership through having ILCs
affects both investments and the availability of financial
resources for investment, especially in societies where
there are many banks. In addition, the clarity of land
ownership could also “[...] induces higher levels of land
improvements.” The economic progress of course brings
happiness to landholders as experienced by the people
of Brazil after obtaining ILCs (Maura 2013). In Mexico,
Valsechhi (2014: 2) reports that people who possess
ILCs are not worried about land tenure conflicts over
their land, and they “can now leave their land” for the
better jobs in the US “without fear of being expropriated
or losing their inheritance” as many migrants from
developing countries usually fail in their migration (Li
2013, Breman 2009). The positive impression has also
come from Mongolia where land privatization through
ILC programs has contributed to economic growth,
good governance and urban/rural development (Myers
and Hetz 2004: i). In Indonesia, Mulyani (2015) also
finds that the individual land certification programs in
Surakarta has enabled the urban poor to obtain their
rights to get access to the state-provided resources.
In contrast, there are also pessimistic and sceptical
claims against ILC programs (Gordon 1975, Place
and Hazell 1993, Smith et al. 2009, Maura 2013).
Maura (2013) argues that land privatization through
ILC programs has increased the happiness of Brazilian
society, but at the same time they have resulted in the
concentration of land ownership into hands of the rich.
In Manggarai, Flores, Gordon (1975: 145-146) reveals
that since the 1970s “[l] and for which titles have
been issued can be bought and sold, and within the
last decade a new class of wealthy entrepreneurs has
emerged in Manggarai capable of buying land. ... [They]
can buy jeeps, build houses, and buy land. Usually they
do all three. But land is often their first choice.” Due
to land grabbing practices through ILC programs, some
academics critically question global ambitions, driven
by advanced capitalist countries such as the United
States, Britain and Germany (Myers & Hetz 2004), to
privatize land through ILC programs (Place & Hazell
1993, Mussembi 2007, Korf et al. 2015). Place and
Hazell (1993), Mussembi (2007), and Korf et al. (2015)
point out that, in Sub-Saharan Africa countries, ILC
programs have accelerated land grabbing processes and
brought about poverty and social conflicts in societies.
In Mexico, ILC programs have increased social conflicts
over land, deforestation, disappearance and weakening
of the role of traditional institutions (Smith et al 2009).
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In Cambodia, World Bank-funded ILC programs to
prevent irresponsible agricultural investment have
increased land tenure conflicts and land transactions
(Dwyer 2015: 903).
RESEARCH METHOD
This research was part of a joint-research that was
conducted in October-November 2013 on the island
of Flores, East Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia which
found the potential economic benefit of land rights
(Kristiansen & Sulistiawati 2016). Flores is a small
island (14. 273 sq. Km), which consists of 8 districts
in East Nusa Tenggara province, Indonesia. The island
of Flores is predominantly Roman Catholic and is one
of the poorest islands in Indonesia. According to the
Indonesian Statistics Bureau (BPS 2010) data, Flores
has a population of 1.8 million, of which 17% are
poor. Poverty in rural Flores is mainly caused by the
long colonial history, agrarian inequality, and the depoliticization of the masses (Tolo 2016a, Tolo 2016b).
The research was conducted in rural Flores in
November-December 2014. However, some of the
data have been collected in previous fieldwork in
2011, 2012 and 2013 in rural Flores. This research
utilized mix-methods (qualitative and quantitative
research) by conducting 30 in-depth interviews and
distributing 320 questionnaires. The respondents were
farmers, customary leaders, religious leaders, political
leaders, bureaucrats and academics. The research was
conducted in three districts and nine villages in rural
Flores, namely Nagekeo district (Dhawe, Mulakoli and
Maukeli), Ngada (Seso, Ruto and Wangka) districts,
and Manggarai districts (Compang Dalo, Narang and
Robek).
The selection of informants was done through a
snowball method. This method, however, may have
led to the uniformity of data due to the fact that each
informant tends to provide recommendations for the next
informant who shares similar views. However, to ensure
the validity of data, the author also applies triangulation
techniques. The selection of sample for the distribution
of questionnaires was done randomly, with careful
consideration to representation of gender, poverty level,
education and age, adat social stratification such as lords
(gae), commoners (c) and slave (ho’o).
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Land inequality has become a perennial problem
in rural Flores since several centuries ago. This is
partly because Florenese people are divided into three
different social classes, namely (1) lords (gae), (2)
commoners (gae kisa) and (3) slaves (ho’o). This social
stratification is the result of Hinduism culture from
India (Arndt 1958), a consequence that took place as
far as the 14th century when Flores was ruled by the
Majapahit Hinduism kingdom (Metzener 1982). In
rural Flores, a ho’o (salve) has no right over land and
has to work as a cultivator of a ga’e (lord) for his or her
survival. A lord (gae), as the highest social caste holder
in Florenese society, is a “land owners and possessors
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of the wealth to be shared with the people of the lower
caste” (Muda 1986: 149) 2001: 70), while a slave (ho’o)
does not possess any “independent rights to land” (Forth
2001: 70).
Due to the fact that a slave does not have any rights over
land, in the past, he or she was treated as a commodity
that could be sold and bought. A slave could also be sent
away from Flores as a tribute to the local kingdoms that
controlled Flores at that time such as Majapahit, Goa,
Ternate and Bima (Gordon 1975). When Flores was
under the control of those local kingdoms, a slave in
rural Flores was valued with two buffaloes in Aimere,
but in Ngada’s hinterland his or her value is equivalent
to six buffaloes. With the obligation to pay tribute to
the sultanate of Bima, Manggarain people often bought
slaves in Aimere and Ngada (Bekkum 1946 [1974]).
The slave trade, however, was banned by the Dutch
in 1838 (Gordon 1975), but it in fact lasted until 1907
(Metzener 1982). To date, the slave trade in rural Flores
has transformed its way in modern slave trade which is
called human trafficking. This is experienced by many
of landless and land hungry people in rural Flores who
sojourn for work overseas (Tolo 2014d).
Regarding the ownership of land, the survey
reveals that 90% of respondents have admitted having
access to land with an average of land ownership of
approximately 2 hectares per family. Although the
average land ownership per family is quite high, most of
the land in rural Flores is actually still concentrated in
the hands of the rich farmer’s families. The data shows
that 34 rich peasant families in rural Flores control
476 hectares of land, while 78 smallholders in Flores
only own 27 hectares. This means that rich farmers,
especially gae’s families, control 17 times the size of the
average smallholder farmers in rural Flores. As a result,
many smallholders and landless famers in rural Flores
work as cultivators in the gae’s agricultural land. The
rich farmers who own this vast land often leave their
land under-utilized, which is about 47% of the total land
they own.
The land in rural Flores is concentrated into the hands
of traditional elites (Orinbao 1992, Tule 2006, Tolo
2012a, Prior 2013), the government (Tule 2013), religious
institutions (Dale 2013), bureaucrats, politicians
(Gordon 1975), investors and corporations (Jebadu 2009,
Dale 2013, Hasiman 2014). According to Tule (2013), in
Nagekeo district, approximately 60% of land, especially
forest land, is owned by the government, 30% by tribes,
and 10% by private owners. In West Manggarai, the
many tracts of rice fields of Lembor have fallen into
the hands of Chinese businessmen. In Manggarai, since
the 1970s, certified land has accrued by bureaucrats
and new wealthy people (Gordon 1975). As Komodo
National Park becomes a famous tourism destination,
many tracts of land in Labuan Bajo have been bought
by the wealthy people from abroad and Jakarta, and this
land transaction was often facilitated by the state (Dale
2013, Tempo 6/3/2015). In Maumere, Tule (2013) reveals
that a religious institution/congregation of Societas
Verdi Divini (SVD) has contracted 200 hectares of
agricultural land from the government for 50-70 years.
In West Manggarai, Dale (2013) reports that one of the
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Catholic religious congregations own about 70 hectares
(agricultural) land. According to Hasiman (2013) and
Regus (2011), many mining investors have grabbed
customary land (lingko) with the help of the state in
rural Flores.
The ownership of vast land by traditional leaders
(adat leaders) in rural Flores is, however, not acceptable.
As part of the Austronesia society, there is no Western
landlord concept in rural Flores, but land guardian
(Tule 2013). As land guardians, the main task of the
adat leaders is in fact to resolve agrarian conflicts and
to ensure that every individual within the clans or tribes
owns enough land to survive. Due to the long history
of colonization, the functions of adat institutions have
changed, and adat leaders are inclined to accumulate
capital as colonizers have done in rural Flores (Tolo
2016b).
Indeed, clan’s land is owned collectively by all the
members of a clan. Although clan’s land has been
distributed as an individual property, land rights are
still owned by all clansmen within the clan. Clan’s land
is thus prohibited for sale in most of the villages in rural
Flores, except in three villages in Manggarai district.
The land in rural Flores is treated and respected as Ine
Tana Ame Watu (Mother of Land and Father of Stones)
which breaths life to and unites all clan members (Tule
2006, Tule 2004). Ine Tana Ame Watu is a customary
terminology in Nagekeo society that respects land as
mother and father of a clan. Land in rural Flores is thus
valued as tribal wealth that ensures social, cultural, and
economic security for all clan members.
The logic behind the rejection of land commodification
in rural Flores is due mainly to the fact that Florenese
people share a principle: “the present generations do
not own the land. The land is still owned by the past
and future generations. The present generations only
possess the right to utilise the land.” For this reason,
most of clan chiefs in Flores prohibit ILC programs
as they can facilitate land transactions. However, in
urgent situations such as health problems, dowry issues
(pasa/belis), land can be sold based on the agreement
of all clan members through a meeting. In this case, the
decision on the sale of individual land is not solely an
individual and family decision, but a collective decision
of the whole clan members. It is because land is not own
by present generations, but past and future generations.
However, to date, due to the penetration of capitalism,
the sale of tribal lands, especially certified land, has
sometimes occurred in several places in rural Flores.
This current commodification of land is confirmed by
the data that the majority of respondents (95%) have
certified their individual land in order to avoid conflict,
and only 4% do that for commodification purposes. For
these two reasons, about 60% of respondents have plans
to make their individual land certificates, and about
40% of respondents have individual land certificates.
The low number of individual land title holdings in
rural Flores is due to the fact that rural people in rural
Flores do not feel ILCs have the benefits of reinforcing
the clarity of land borders as the boundaries of land
are already clear and socially recognized by adat
institutions. Moreover, registering land in Indonesia is
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lengthy and costly (Gold & Zuckerman 2015). Based
on Government Regulation 13/2010, registering land is
relatively expensive for farmers in rural Flores. In rural
Flores, Manggarai, as Gordon (1975: 145) argues, “[l]
and disputes in Manggarai are less often concerned
with land titles than with other aspects of agriculture.
Thus the Manggarai do not feel a great need to rush in to
Ruteng and pay to have their land holding measured and
registered. A further reason which delays the progress
of ‘agraria’ is that many villagers think registration will
lead to more taxes.”
However, in order to achieve national targets, local
governments in rural Flores keep promoting ILC
programs. Based on data from district NLAs (2014)
in Flores, the number of farmers who have ILCs is
increasing every year. In 2013-2014, district LNA in
Nagekeo issued 1,600 pieces of ILCs through PRONA.
In Compang Dalo village in Manggarai, in 2010, the
government provided 1,300 ILCs for free. In Nagekeo,
the district Marine and Fisheries office, in collaboration
with district NLA, also provided 75 pieces of ILCs in
2013-2015 to those who live in coastal areas funded by
the provincial government. These ILC programs have
sometimes intensified land tenure conflicts in rural
Flores as some of the people who have registered their
land tend to sell their land without consulting with other
members of the clan as they treat their land as individual
land which is independent from other clan members. In
many cases, ILC issuance in rural Flores is sometimes
conducted without a careful examination of the land
ownership status. This is problematic as the majority
of NLA employees in Flores are not indigenous people,
but migrants from Java, Kupang and Bali who do not
fully understand the land tenure systems in rural Flores.
Land tenure conflicts in rural Flores are also common
between migrants, transmigrants and local residents
as migrants, especially transmigrants, who have ILCs
that are provided without charge by the government
tend to be apathetic to traditional ceremonies related
to land. In fact, before the land was handed over to a
local government for the benefits of transmigration
programs, the status of the land is a clan land. In Mbay,
Nagekeo, for instance, having ILCs, the transmigrants –
who obtained land from the indigenous peoples handed
over it to the government in 1973– tend to disobey
social contracts to contribute materially to traditional
ceremonies. In addition, this certified clan land that
has been owned individually is sold to foreigners,
bureaucrats, politicians and Chinese businessmen. The
ownership of ILCs, in the long run, may also create
poverty in rural Flores. It is because some individuals
who tend to sell their certified land to meet their daily
needs. As a result, when land is sold out, a family
usually falls into hard life and become waged labourers.
Waged labourers in rural Flores are commonly found
in Manggarai, whose traditional institutions are the
weakest in preventing land commodification (Erb 2010).
Further, Manggarai district is one of the districts in rural
Flores that has produced many migrant workers who are
usually entrapped into human trafficking in Malaysia.
Some of the Florenese migrant workers in Malaysia
have sold their land to finance their trips to Malaysia
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and left their families working as waged labourers back
home (Kurniasanti, 2004).
Considering today’s Florenese cultural and political
economic conditions, we argue that if ILCs programs
are still implemented, horizontal land tenure conflicts
and poverty will continue to escalate in rural Flores.
However, this negative trend can be prevented if the
collective land certification (CLC) programs that were
introduced by the government in rural Flores since
1996 continue to be implemented to the present day.
This CLC in rural Flores is called Serie A, which was
introduced by the local governments in Flores for
rural communities in the 1990s. In Serie A as CLC,
all the names of clan members are registered as the
owners of certain pieces of land. Usually, Series A is
held by the chief of a clan. The land tax will be paid
by all individuals whose names are listed in Series A
as landowners. According to Tule (2013), in Nagekeo,
there are about 10% of the land with Series A as CLCs,
30% ILCs and 60% without ILCs and Series A.
We argue that CLC programs in rural Flores could
bring the following benefits. First, CLC programs may
preserve local cultures and traditions in relation to land.
Second, CLC programs could encourage people to
contribute to enhancing rural development by actively
paying taxes. The social control of CLC programs
within a clan may push people to pay their taxes. Third,
CLC programs could reduce land tenure conflicts as they
could make sure that every individual knows clearly the
land borders within and outside the clan. Fourth, CLC
programs could prevent commodification of land. CLC
programs are thus an alternative compromise solution
to prevent the dangers of feudalism and capitalism that
are targeting rural Flores as the most strategic island for
privatization and capital accumulation in agriculture,
tourism and mining sectors. However, the CLC in
rural Flores should be preceded by agrarian reform by
leverage (Powelson & Stock 1987, Wiradi 2000), since
land ownership in rural Flores today is still concentrated
on the hands of landlords, Chinese businessmen,
bureaucrats and political elites, the government and
mining and tourism investors (Tolo 2013b, Tolo 2014a,
Tolo 2014c).
CONCLUSION
Along with the penetration of capitalism to rural
Flores since the colonial era (Gordon 1975), the
inequality of land ownership has continued to increase
until to date (Tolo 2012). However, amidst of a plethora
of land inequality in rural Flores, ILC programs are
still introduced to Florenese people by the government.
Instead of enhancing rural development in rural Flores,
the programs may have actually exacerbated the
existing problems of poverty, land inequality and land
tenure conflicts as the programs may have undermined
the social and cultural cohesion of communities, which
is united by collective land ownership. Moreover, ILC
programs tend to encourage people to sell their land,
which in turn could lead to the concentration of land in
the hands of the wealthy. Consequently, this has led to
the increase of economic gap between the rich and the
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poor in Flores (Tolo 2016). We argue that poverty and
land tenure conflict may escalate in the years to come if
ILC programs are allowed to continue their programs
in rural Flores. We recommend that the government
implement CLC programs in Flores as they are more
suitable with the cultural and political economy
conditions of rural Flores. However, CLC should
be preceded by agrarian reform by leverage because
land in rural Flores is mainly still concentrated on the
hands of the wealthy (Powelson & Stock 1987, Wiradi
2000). Therefore, agrarian reform by leverage must be
a prerequisite for the implementation of CLC programs
in rural Flores.
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